Why 1971 Was Inevitable: A Simple Structural Explanation

 

1971 did not fall from the sky. It was not an emotional outburst, nor the result of sudden hatred. It was the predictable outcome of long-term political, economic, and institutional discrimination embedded in the Pakistani state.

To understand 1971, one must first understand the logic of Pakistan’s creation.

The Lahore Resolution and Its Distortion

The 1940 Lahore Resolution, proposed by A.K. Fazlul Huq of Bengal, spoke of “Independent States” in the Muslim-majority regions of north-western and eastern India. The wording was deliberately plural and ambiguous. It allowed the possibility of autonomous, self-governing Muslim regions, not a highly centralized state.

However, under Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s insistence on the Two-Nation Theory and through the hurried Radcliffe partition, this ambiguity was resolved in favor of a single, centralized Pakistan—geographically split into two wings separated by more than a thousand miles of hostile territory.

Assam, which could have naturally aligned with eastern Bengal, remained with India. The eastern wing entered Pakistan not as an equal partner, but as a structurally weaker half.

Why East Bengal Accepted Pakistan

The Muslims of East Bengal accepted Pakistan for a simple reason: material expectation. Not poetry, not slogans.

They believed that in a Muslim-majority state:

they would gain equal access to government jobs,

economic opportunities would improve,

systemic discrimination would end.

Instead, they discovered that religion replaced colonial rulers, but not colonial logic.

Language, Education, and Structural Exclusion

Although Bengali was eventually recognized as a state language (1954–56), state policy consistently undermined that recognition.

The Sharif Education Commission recommended:

Urdu as the primary medium of education,

compulsory English from early grades,

withdrawal of free education,

and even the use of Roman script for Bengali.

Whether fully implemented or not, these recommendations clearly reflected the mindset of the ruling elite. For a largely poor, rural population, this meant one thing: systematic exclusion from social mobility.

Education was being redesigned in a way that favored urban, elite, Urdu-speaking families of West Pakistan—while marginalizing Bengali peasants and workers.

Economic Reality: A Classic Colonial Pattern

By the early 1960s, economists at Dhaka University demonstrated with data that:

foreign exchange reserves generated in East Pakistan were held in the West,

taxation decisions were made in the West,

development spending disproportionately favored West Pakistan.

Despite being the majority population, East Pakistanis held:

no more than 35% of civil service positions,

around 5% of military posts.

This was not accidental. It was structural.

1965 War: The Mask Fell

The 1965 India–Pakistan war made one reality impossible to ignore: East Pakistan was militarily expendable.

With minimal troops, almost no heavy artillery, a single under-equipped airbase, and negligible air defense, the eastern wing was effectively undefended.

This confirmed what many already suspected: East Pakistan was treated not as a homeland to be protected, but as a resource colony to be exploited.

Six Points: Reform, Not Secession

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Six-Point Program was not a declaration of independence. It was a minimum framework for survival:

separate fiscal control,

economic autonomy,

local control over revenue.

Even elements within the military and naval forces began to rethink the existing power structure—not necessarily independence, but meaningful autonomy.

Yet instead of negotiation, the state chose repression.

Democracy Rejected

In the 1970 election, the Awami League won an absolute majority. Constitutionally, power transfer should have followed.

It did not.

Because the idea of Bengalis governing Pakistan was unacceptable to the West Pakistani ruling elite.

Instead, troops were quietly reinforced. Talks were staged. And on 25 March 1971, the state chose violence over democracy.

What Freedom Meant to Ordinary People

For the Bengali masses, freedom was not an abstract concept.

It meant:

freedom from hunger,

freedom from permanent poverty,

freedom to educate their children,

freedom to compete fairly for jobs,

freedom to live with dignity.

1971 was a war for structural liberation, not emotional revenge.

After Independence

Bangladesh is not a perfect state. No serious person claims it is.

But it is proof of one simple truth:

a population freed from systematic extraction can develop on its own terms.

Over time, Bangladesh has surpassed Pakistan on multiple social and economic indicators. This is not a nationalist boast—it is empirical evidence.

Final Reflection

Independence is not a luxury. It is a rational response to persistent structural injustice.

The tragedy would be to recreate, in a new form, the same inequalities that made independence necessary in the first place.

That is the real lesson of 1971.